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Abstract 
There has been a growing literature on empirical studies on status consciousness. 
Specifically, the predictions of signaling models and theory of subjective well-being are 
empirically tested and found to support status seeking behavior. Instead of relying on these 
established theoretical models on status seeking behavior, we adopt a very general approach 
and model how individuals’ status seeking behavior influences their consumption patterns. 
We define both an aspiration aspect and a pride aspect of status. Individuals aspire to reach 
higher status which we call aspiration aspect of status. Individuals also try their best to 
maintain at least their current status with respect to relatively lower income group class, 
which we call the pride aspect of status. We model these two aspects of status for the U.S 
households using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data. Some of the results obtained 
go against the conventional signaling models which predict that as the mean income of the 
reference group increases, consumption of conspicuous goods decreases. Also, we get results 
contrary to Duesenberry’s claim that rich are not concerned about their position relative to 
lower income group class. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, there has been an upsurge in an academic interest on individual’s status seeking 
behavior. Precursors to the present research on this topic can be traced back to the works by 
Smith (1776) and Veblen (1899). Veblen coined the term ‘conspicuous consumption’ to 
demonstrate how the wealthy class consumed valuable goods (which in itself did not have 
any intrinsic utility) to distinguish themselves from other classes of the society. Duesenberry 
(1949) emphasized that an individual’s utility does not depend on absolute consumption, but 
on consumption relative to the average. The above studies reveal that whether be it 
‘conspicuous’  or composite consumption good, consumption relative to the average matters 
a lot for an individual’s happiness. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive empirical 
study of the said aspect of individuals’ preferences which is termed as “status effect”. The 
study is comprehensive in the sense that we not only test for the presence of status 
consciousness among individuals, but we also look at the impact of status on financial 
allocations of a household. If status affects financial decisions of a household, then it is 
evident that this is a direct consequence of inequality and hence the policy makers should 
devise policies to reduce inequality. 
There is a voluminous theoretical and empirical literature on subjective well-being (see 
survey by Kahneman and Kreuger, (2006)). Easterlin (1974) was the first to provide 
empirical evidence that relative income is an important factor in subjective well-being (see 
also (1995) and (2001)). He looks at the income distribution of individuals across countries 
over time and finds that within a country as income of individuals grow over time, self-
reported happiness grows up to a point and remains unchanged thereafter. In other words, the 
increase in income is correlated to happiness only to a certain extent. The real increase in 
happiness comes from income relative to the average and since it is the standard of living that 
has improved over time and not one’s relative position, self-reported happiness did not 
increase. Using German panel data (GSOEP), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds that relative 
income is as important as absolute income in subjective well-being. Also, Luttmer (2005) 
using National Survey of Family and Households (NSFH), finds that individuals’ utility 
depends partly on relative income. Using Indonesia micro level data, Powdthavee  (2009) 
finds that it is the individuals’ ranking in the community or reference group that matters for 
one’s well-being and not the mean income of the reference group.  
There has also been considerable research on status concern using the framework of Spence’s 
(1973) signaling model. In this class of models (Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Ireland 
(1994))), conspicuous consumption is used as a signal to reflect one’s income or wealth. 
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Using a signaling framework, Glazer and Konrad (1996) demonstrate how charitable 
donations may be considered as a signal for one’s unobserved wealth. Moav and Neeman 
(2012) model the case where the consumption of conspicuous goods serves as a signal of 
individuals’ wealth. The authors argue that the more educated individuals are, the higher is 
their ability to earn by skills they have acquired and as a result, those with higher human 
capital, need to signal (their income) less by consuming less of the conspicuous goods. On 
the other hand, as the poor spends a large fraction of their income on conspicuous 
consumption, it leaves them with a lower share of expenditure for investment in education for 
the next generation. This in turn generates lower income for the next generation, eventually 
leading to a poverty trap. The exact opposite thing happens for the rich, whose income 
continue to rise. Based on the aforementioned signaling models of status concern, Charles, 
Hurst and Roussanov (2009) conducts empirical tests to check for the impact of status 
seeking behaviour on the consumption of certain conspicuous goods which they term as 
visible1 goods. The theoretical model outlined in their paper predicts a decrease in the 
consumption of the visible goods as the average income of the reference group increases; i.e. 
the aspiration level of the individual goes down as the target to be reached increases. In their 
paper, the reference group is based on race and state. Data shows that Whites earn more than 
African Americans, and thus the average income of White reference group is higher than 
African American reference group. They find that African Americans spend much more on 
visible goods than comparable Whites. This is because within a reference group Whites need 
to reach a much higher visible goods consumption target to acquire higher status. Since the 
target to be reached is very high, their aspiration level goes down. Thus, the results support 
the prediction of the signaling model.  
Following this approach, using South African data, Kaus (2013) finds that while this rationale 
works for coloured and Blacks, it does not work for Whites. Both Charles, Hurst and 
Roussanov (2009) and Kaus (2013) find that to accommodate high spending on visible goods, 
the minority group in both countries (U.S.A and South Africa) spend less on health 
expenditures. Khamis, Nishith and Zarah (2012) apply Charles, Hurst and Roussanov’s 
(2009) approach to Indian data, where reference groups are based on caste and religion. Their 
results match the signaling model’s prediction; similar to Charles, Hurst and Roussanov 
(2009), they also find that differences in spending on visible goods still persists (although 
significantly drops) after controlling for mean income of the reference groups. They conclude 
1 Charles, Hurst and Roussanov (2009) use the term ‘visible’ goods which are defined by goods that are 
“observable” and “portable”. 
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that this suggests that preferences might be specific to social groups that are considered. 
Although there have been many empirical studies on status seeking behavior some of which 
incorporate the signaling framework, there are a number of concerns that this present paper 
aims to address. 
One principal concern relates to the choice of status goods. In the literature, there is no 
consensus as to which goods are status goods. To test the effect of status, researchers have 
considered variants of status goods as per their study. For example, Chao and Schor (1998) 
choose women’s cosmetics as the status good and look at the brand buying pattern to test 
status consumption. Bloch, Rao and Desai (2004) consider wedding celebrations as status 
good. As mentioned earlier, Charles, Hurst and Roussanov (2009) consider visible goods as 
status goods. Heffetz (2011) considers a range of goods and test conspicuous consumption by 
measuring the association between visibility of the goods and their income elasticities. He 
finds that there is a strong correlation between visibility of the goods and their associated 
income elasticity only for high income groups. He considers visible goods as status goods 
and non-visible goods as necessary goods. However, note that in the papers by Charles, Hurst 
and Roussanov (2009) and Heffetz (2011), the visible goods constitute only a subset of 
luxury goods, as even non-visible good may also be a luxury good. Instead of tagging certain 
goods as status goods based on subjective (visibility, brand buying pattern and so on) choice 
of the researcher, we pick all the goods that are available in the data, and then select status 
goods based on the consumption pattern of individuals which forms the novelty of our 
methodology.  
To illustrate this idea, let us suppose that there are only two groups of people: one group who 
can afford anything and everything and another group who can afford only some goods. If 
status conscious is present amongst the latter group then it wishes to consume all the 
expensive things that are bought by the relatively higher income group. However, the 
relatively lower income group cannot afford all of those expensive goods at one go, so they 
space out the consumption of such goods over time. When we look at one cross section, what 
we will typically observe is that such goods will have a high variance in consumption. This is 
because, a cross section is just a snap shot of the population at one point in time and at that 
point some households may have bought such expensive goods and some who have not. This 
will result in a high variance of consumption of the expensive goods. On the other hand, the 
goods that are left behind are necessarily essential goods which are required every time 
period and will thus have low variance. In addition to this it is also likely that the rate at 
which the consumption of non-status goods changes with a change in the level of income or 
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other exogenous factors (such as age, family composition etc.) is relatively lower than that for 
the status goods. This also contributes towards a relatively higher variance in consumption of 
the status goods relative to the non-status goods. Thus a suitable classification of the 
consumables into status and non-status goods based on their respective variation in 
consumption forms the crux of our approach.  
Once we identify the status goods, we test for presence of status consciousness. It is here that 
we presume that status consciousness is characterized by two different aspects: an aspiration 
aspect and a pride aspect. Individuals aspire to reach higher status which we call aspiration 
aspect of status. Individuals also try their best to maintain their current level of status with 
respect to relatively lower status group, which we term the pride aspect of status. In this 
regard, Duesenberry claims that comparisons made in “downward direction” (which we refer 
to as pride aspect) do not matter. Ferrer-i-Carbonell’s (2005) paper finds evidence in support 
of Duesenberry’s claim. Since, we also consider the pride aspect of status; we test for 
Duesenberry’s claim. We find that both the aspiration aspect and pride aspect of status 
consciousness are significant in all the versions of the model that we test for status. Thus our 
results contraindicate Duesenberry’s claim and supports that individuals try their best to 
maintain their current level of status. One of the drawbacks of other studies is the assumption 
that the value of the status variable (given by the mean income of the reference group) of all 
individuals within a reference group is same. In reality, the target (status the individual is 
trying to reach by consuming the conspicuous goods) is expected to differ for each individual 
even within the same reference group (whether be it defined by a geographical region or race) 
based on their level of income. Our approach is more general, in the sense that we allow for 
the target to vary across individuals within the same reference group.  
Next, compared to the existing literature, we consider a lower level of geographical area as 
the reference group instead of some broader definitions of the reference group (as for 
example race and state in Charles, Hurst and Roussanov (2009)). There are two reasons for it. 
First, it is our assumption that individuals are status conscious based on the economic 
condition in their neighbourhood rather than race or caste or any such classification. Second, 
this can also be considered as a test of robustness for our empirical findings. This is because 
if the results hold for region based distinction of the reference groups, it is expected to be 
more significant when race or some other demographic classification combined with region is 
used as the frame of reference group. 
5 
 
Apart from its impact on the expenditure of status goods, we also look at the impact of status 
on household’s financial decisions, like overall consumption expenditure, debt and savings. 
We find that status significantly alters all these major financial allocations of the households. 
Thus our contribution to the empirical literature on status effect is thus fourfold. First, we 
identify status goods using a unique approach where we can deduce whether a good is status 
or not by just looking at the consumption pattern of goods. Secondly, our status variable is 
also very generic in the sense that it allows us to look at both aspects of status and allow each 
individual’s realization of status (aspiration and pride) values to be different across 
individuals even within same reference group. Thirdly, we narrow our extent of the reference 
group and still obtain statistically significant results of the impact of status. Lastly, to our 
knowledge this is the first study which has looked at the impact of status on other major 
financial allocations of a household other than expenditures on select consumables: the status 
goods. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. The method of 
constructing the status variable is laid down in section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
models and empirical results. Section 5 discusses policy implications while section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Data 
For this study, we use Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data compiled by the 
Institute of Social Research at University of Michigan. The PSID is a nationally 
representative sample based on a random sample of U.S households. The PSID started in 
1968 and interviews were conducted annually till 1997, and bi-annually henceforth. For our 
analysis, we use only the latest available PSID wave, which is 2011 since utilizing the panel 
structure of the data would imply sacrificing lot of observations. Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CES) data is collected by U.S Department of Labor and is another commonly used 
data source for work related to consumption. We use PSID data for a couple of reasons. The 
most important reason being that PSID data consists of observations identified at much lower 
geographical levels (refer to Appendix I for a breakdown of urban-rural regions as classified 
by PSID) as compared to CES. CES data do not cover all states and has a broader 
classification of urban and rural regions. On the other hand, PSID has much narrower 
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division of urban, metropolitan and rural areas based on population.2 The other reason for 
using PSID is that PSID compared to CES, provides reliable data on income (Charles, Hurst 
and Roussanov, (2009)). The only reason in favour of using CES would have been that CES 
has more consumption categories than PSID. However, we use thirty consumption categories 
from PSID which covers most of the aspects of consumption and is thus sufficient to conduct 
our analysis. 
Table 1 provides some statistics related to the demographic, expenditure, income and wealth 
variables.3 Education4, age, gender, race and marital status are for the head of the household. 
Income of the family consists of taxable income, transfers, social security income of head, 
wife and other family members. Debt, wealth with and without home equity is included in the 
table. Total consumption expenditure data is obtained from consumption expenditure data 
extracts (using PSID main interview files) from PSID. As is evident from table 1, average 
household total expenditure is lower than average household income. Table 2 summarizes 
household expenditures. Expenditures are split into two broad categories, food5 and non-
food. Food’s share of total expenditure is about 17 percent and non-food’s share is about 83 
percent. Food at home accounts for most of the expenditure share within food category. 
Housing expenditures is obtained by combining expenditures on mortgage, rent, home 
insurance and utilities6, accounts for the highest contributor to non-food expenditures. The 
next highest contributor is transportation which includes vehicle loan, vehicle lease, vehicle 
down payment, auto insurance, vehicle repairs, vehicle maintenance, bus and train fares, 
taxicabs, gasoline, and parking. 
 
3. Constructing the Status Variable 
2 We are using a collapsed version of urban-region code. The un-collapsed version gives a further split of rural 
region into two categories.  Since the rural region consists of only about 2 percent (243 observations) of the 
sample and given that there are 51 states, we thought it is best to use the collapsed version of urban-region 
code as it retains more observations at the state-sector level. Moreover, special permission is required from 
PSID to use the un-collapsed version. 
3 All expenditures and income are as of year 2010 (for 2011 PSID data file). 
4 Values in the range of 1 to 12 means years of schooling. 12 means high school graduate.  Values in the range 
of 13 to16 means 12 plus years of college. 16 refer to college graduate and 17 refer to at least some post-
graduate education. 
5 Food expenditures in PSID consumption expenditures data extracts exclude government transfers. Thus food 
expenditures using food stamps were added using PSID main interview files. For our analysis, in the rest of the 
paper, we use food expenditures using food stamps. 
6 Utilities here include electricity, gas, water, sewer and other utilities and also internet and telephone. Although 
internet/telephone is part of utilities, it is not included in the utilities variable in PSID as it was not originally 
included in the 1999 file. Unless otherwise mentioned, in our paper, we have kept internet/telephone separately 
from utilities. 
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In order to meaningfully estimate any relationship that involves individuals’ response to 
status with their allocative decisions, we need to quantify the factor/s that promotes status 
seeking behaviour. Since the generally accepted norm is that an individual’s status perception 
stems from her relative position or standing in the society, the natural question that arises is 
what yardstick to use to measure this very relative position of the individual. The obvious 
answer that comes to mind is the rank of the individual’s income within the society. But the 
use of individuals’ incomes would be justified only if individuals could observe each other’s 
income. In reality, income is not readily observable and thus we consider individuals’ total 
consumption expenditures within a reference7 group to determine the societal position for any 
given individual. In addition to this, since we also require differentiating between an 
individual’s perception of the aspiration and pride aspects of status, we construct two 
variables that indicate the extent to which an individual is placed in a social ladder from the 
point of view of the highest and the lowest societal positions. Finally, although it is the 
individual who is status conscious, but it is the household which takes the allocative decisions 
and therefore for our purpose, we treat households to be synonymous to individuals. 
Furthermore, for any given household, we consider the median of total expenditures of the 
relatively richer (poorer) households (recall that households are synonymous to individuals) 
belonging to the same reference group as the given household to reflect the aspiration (pride) 
aspect of status of the household.  
 
4. Empirical Models and Results     
Now that we have constructed the status variables of the households, we are in a position to 
discuss about the implications of status on the different allocative decisions made by a 
household. The first exercise that we undertake is to analyse the impact of status on the 
households’ consumption of various goods. This follows because once an individual 
perceives her relative societal position, she has the option to “mend her self” by revising her 
consumption pattern of certain “status” goods to emulate those of the individuals who are 
higher up the social ladder or to differentiate from the individuals who are lower than her 
relative position in the society. One way to classify goods into status and non-status goods is 
to take one good at a time and obtain the relationship of the expenditure share of the good 
with status, income and other variables. But such an exercise suffers from the problem of 
aggregation (of the goods). If the good under consideration is very narrowly defined (for 
7 The reference group we consider is the narrowest possible geographical area provided by the data. 
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example, vehicle loan as opposed to all vehicle expenditures), then it leads to a high variance 
in the demand for the good across the individuals. This renders all the variables insignificant 
in the regression even when we use a suitable model. Thus, we formulate an alternative 
procedure (discussed below) where we do not have to rely on regression results to classify 
status and non-status goods. 
We develop an approach in which we use individuals’ expenditure pattern on goods to 
distinguish between status and non-status goods. First, we arrange the households in order of 
per capita total expenditure (after adjusting for equivalence scales)8 and then divide the 
sample into four groups at 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles. We call these groups, low spend, 
lower middle spend, upper middle spend and rich. Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 denote the expenditure on good l 
of household k belonging to spend group i and state-sector j. Within each spend group and 
state-sector, we calculate the mean household expenditure of each item, ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑙. Then we 
construct the ratio of expenditure of each household k on item l to the average household 
expenditure of that item within the same state-sector: 
𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 ≡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑙
 . 
The purpose of taking the ratio is to adjust for the cost of living within the particular 
combination of state and sector. Next, we compute the variance of each item within each 
spend group: 
𝑉𝑖𝑙 ≡
∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙−𝑅�𝑖𝑙)2𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑘𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑘𝑗
, where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 is household weight.  
We look at the variance of expenditure of each item within each spend group, 𝑉𝑖𝑙  and then 
rank the items from low variance to high variance. The presumption here is that items for 
which variance is low are considered essential for those households and items for which 
variance is high, can be considered as status goods.  
Our proposed methodology has three principal advantages. First, we do not need to mark any 
good as status good based on subjective choice (discussed in detail in introduction). Next, we 
do not need to distinguish between the statuses audiences. To understand what we mean by 
this, consider the following. There are some goods which are visible to neighbours and some 
goods which are visible only to extended family members and friends who visit a household’s 
house. Depending on whom the household prefers to display status, the consumption of the 
8 Following Citro and Michaels (1995), equivalent Scale for a household with ‘nad’ number of adults and ‘nch’ 
number of children is given by (nad+0.7nch) P, where P ranges from 0.65 to 0.75. Betson and Michael (1993) 
found estimate of P to be 0.76. However, since the recommendation for upper limit on P is 0.75, we selected a 
value of 0.75 for P to calculate the equivalent scales for households.  
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type of visible goods varies.  Our approach takes care of this distinction of visible goods 
meant to convey status signal either to neighbours or to the household’s extended 
family/friends and visitors. Finally, our approach also selects those status goods which are 
not meant to “display” status to others but purely for self-fulfilment. Apart from getting 
satisfaction by displaying status to others, one also derives happiness from the fact that she 
has been able to purchase certain goods which the household considers as a status good 
purely based on subjective valuation and not on its physical properties. 
Based on the methodology described above, we order the goods according to their relative 
acceptability, as status goods. Since there are 30 consumption items in the data and no 
standard technique to select the rank cut-off to draw the line between status and non-status 
goods, we choose 15 as our cut-off rank which coincides to half of the number of the 
consumption items. All items whose rank is less than or equal to 15 is taken as non-status 
goods while the rest are considered status goods. For the sake of robustness, we also rerun the 
results using rank of 10 to be the dividing line with no apparent change in the results9. Table 
3 displays the ranking of items within each spend group.  As can be seen from the table, there 
is not much fluctuation of rankings across the spend groups except few items. For example, 
items such as number of trips, food delivered at home and parking fees have relatively higher 
rankings in the low and lower middle spend groups. There is a strong correlation between 
income and spend and thus low spend can be associated with low income group. This implies 
that the above mentioned items are expected to be luxury goods for these groups and thus 
have relatively high rankings. Vehicle loan and mortgage has relatively high ranking for 
lower spend group and this is again a luxury for this group. In order to take a loan for vehicle, 
one has to have good credit history or the expectation of paying the loan with current income 
flow and the lower spend group is less likely to have any of these. On the other hand, rent has 
a low ranking for the lower spend group, as this group is more likely to rent than own a 
house. Thus, based on the stability of rankings across spend groups and the above 
observations, we can safely conclude that it is appropriate to identify status goods using the 
expenditure pattern approach. Having identified the status goods and constructed the status 
variable, we proceed in analyzing the presence and impact of status consciousness.10  
9  Note that increasing the cut-off steeply increases the number of zeros in our dependent variable.  
10 For all the regression exercises, we include only those state-sectors where we have at least 30 observations. 
We then exclude the top and bottom 10 observations (after arranging it by total expenditure in increasing 
order) because we want to ensure that there are at least 10 observations from which to calculate the status 
variable for a household. For example, if we take the household corresponding to 29th observation, we have 
only the 30th observation to calculate the aspiration aspect of status. Calculating status variable from just one 
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First, we look at the results of presence of status consciousness. The hypothesis is that if 
individuals’ are status conscious, then we would expect that the expenditure share of status 
goods, after controlling for the effect of income and other covariates, be positively related to 
the status variable. Since this involves an Engel relationship, we use the model specification 
proposed by Leser (1963) with additional components to accommodate the status variables.  
Leser proposed this specification to estimate the Engel curve and showed that this 
specification performs better than other specifications. Thus we estimate the following 
equation: 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑗
𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗
= 𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽ln (𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐴 ) + 𝛾ln (𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐷 ) + 𝜃𝑟 ln�𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗� + 𝛿𝑟 1𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗 + 𝜇𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑟𝑗  (1) 
where 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑗 is sum of expenditures on all status goods and 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗 denotes total 
expenditure, 𝑟 indicates region (urban-rural code combination) and 𝑗 refers to household. In 
the above specification, 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗 is suspect to be an endogenous variable. This is because total 
expenditures and the expenditures on status are determined simultaneously by the households 
and it is likely that a change in the expenditure behind the status goods (and hence its ratio to 
the total expenditure) statistically affects the total consumption expenditure. Thus, in order to 
obtain meaningful estimates, we use income as an instrument for total expenditure to estimate 
equation 1. As mentioned earlier, there are two status variables. The aspiration aspect of 
status is denoted by 𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐴 , and pride aspect by 𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐷 . The status variables are constructed in the 
following manner. Within each region 𝑟, each household 𝑗’s aspiration (pride) reference 
group is those households whose total expenditure is higher (lower) than household 𝑗’s total 
expenditure. Next, we pick the median of total expenditure of the aspiration/pride reference 
group as the aspiration/pride aspect status variable. Note that unlike the signaling model, in 
our approach, the status variable for each household is likely to differ. Controls that we use 
for the regression are number of family members and number of adults, both in logs and at 
the household level. We also include dummies for race, age, age-squared, education, 
dummies for marital status and gender, all these variables taken for household head only.  
Table 4 gives the estimation results for equation 1. We have provided the results for two 
different cut-offs for selection between status and non-status goods. For cut-off of 10 and 15, 
we find both the status variables are positive and significant. Results also indicate that 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗 
is an endogenous variable and that income is an appropriate instrument for total expenditures. 
observation entails high variance in the status variable. Since we want more observations from which to 
calculate the status variable, we ensure that there are at least 10 such observations.    
                                                                                                                                                        
11 
 
Now that we have established the fact that status consciousness is present among individuals, 
we evaluate the impact of status on other financial decisions of the households. 
There are several ways by which a household may increase its expenditure on status goods.  
One is by reducing its share of expenditure on non-status goods. This is precisely what we 
just saw in the results above, that being affected by status, households increase their 
expenditure share on status goods. Another way that the household can increase its 
consumption of status goods is by borrowing. Debt imposes a burden on the consumer, but 
being status conscious, the household may still want to incur debt in order to purchase status 
goods. In order to look at the effect of status on debt11, we estimate the following equation 
using: ln (𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑟𝑗) = 𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽ln (𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐴 ) + 𝛾ln (𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐷 ) + 𝜃𝑟 ln�𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑗� + 𝜇𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑟𝑗        (2) 
Controls that we use for the regression are same as in equation 1. Table 5 gives the results for 
the regression.12 Without fixed effects, the aspiration aspect of status is insignificant. With 
fixed effects, however, both the aspects of status are positive and significant. However, the 
pride aspect is stronger than the aspiration aspect. The implication of this result is that 
individuals are willing to take more debt burden in order to maintain their current status. 
When it comes to reaching higher status, the consumer is relatively less willing to add on 
debt. Other things to note are: income and race variables are insignificant. Except age, all the 
other control variables are significant.  
There is yet another way to increase expenditure on status goods and that is by running down 
savings. Since individuals’ consumption and savings decisions are taken jointly (one unit of 
additional consumption means one unit less of savings), looking at total expenditure net of 
income and other earnings, also reflects considering savings or net assets.  Thus, if status 
effect is present, then total expenditures should be positively related to status variables after 
one controls for income and debts (which we collectively refer to as “brought-in-cash”) as 
estimated from the relation:  ln (𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗) = 𝛼𝑟 + ln (𝛽𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐴 ) + 𝛾ln (𝑆𝑟𝑗𝐷 ) + 𝜃𝑟 ln�𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑗� + 𝜇𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑟𝑗        (3) 
where 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑗 denotes total expenditure and 𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑗 is brought-in-cash.13   
Instead of causality from brought-in-cash to total expenditure, it is possible that causality runs 
in both directions especially since we have argued that debts are incurred by a household to 
11 Debt comprises of credit card debt, student loan, medical debt and family loan. 
12 There are 2,347 observations which are left censored. For this reason, we use Tobit regression. 
13 We drop property taxes from total expenditure and expenditure share because taxes are not accounted for in 
utility maximization problem. 
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purchase status goods – one of the constituents of total expenditure. This might give rise to 
the problem of endogeneity. We estimate equation 3 using income as instrument for brought-
in-cash. The reason for using income as an instrument is that the amount of income received, 
is not amenable to changes in demands of status goods and to total expenditures. Also, it is 
expected that households’ debt potential depends on income and thus are correlated. This 
implies that income can be used an instrument for brought-in-cash. However, the endogeneity 
test for brought-in-cash was rejected. Hence, we estimated the equation using OLS. Table 6 
reports the results with and without fixed effects. Both the aspects of status are positive and 
significant implying status effect. Brought-in-cash is also very significant and is of positive 
sign as expected. To elaborate on the shift in status responsiveness with relative income, we 
also rerun the above regression interacting the status variable with an indicator for the income 
class. To be precise, we divide the population into ten deciles from low income to high 
income on per-capita14 basis. We then interact the status variables with income deciles 
indicator. Table 7 shows the results with and without fixed effects. All the status coefficients 
across all income deciles are significant. For pride aspect of status, the status coefficients are 
decreasing across income deciles. The implication of this is that sensitivity of status is 
decreasing with income. In other words, individuals’ pride aspect of status becomes weaker 
as income increases. The reverse happens for aspiration aspect. As an individual gets richer, 
the aspiration aspect of status becomes stronger.  
Summing up, our results indicate that status consciousness is strongly present among 
individuals. Wherever we expected status to have an impact on the financial allocations of the 
households, such association turned out to be supported statistically. Moreover our results are 
also robust to the extent that any suitable change in the construction of the variables 
pertaining to our empirical model does not invalidate our results. 
 
5. Policy Implications  
Given our empirical findings, there are a number of potential implications of our results from 
the point of view of public policies. We test and confirm that households, given their income 
levels, respond to changes in the expenditures of other households of the reference group, by 
altering not only their relative consumptions of various consumables but also their debt 
burden and overall consumption expenditure. In addition to this, we also find that the extents 
14 Dividing household income by number of family members in the household gives a better measure of 
purchasing power than household income itself. Everything else equal, only the difference in number of 
family members can place two households (via the purchasing power effect) in different positions in the 
(aspiration and pride) reference groups. 
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of these responses by the households depend on whether the expenditures change for the 
relatively poor or for the relatively rich in the reference group. This prediction accordingly 
necessitates the formulation of a preference structure that allows for an asymmetry not only 
in the way the distribution of expenditures alters the marginal utility of the various 
consumables (i.e. across the status and non-status goods) but also in the way in which a 
change in the distribution affects the overall utility of the representative individual based on 
her relative position in the distribution. This altercation in consumer preferences would 
obviously imply certain non-trivial responses for other aspects of household financial 
behavior beyond the consumption and saving decisions. For example, it might lead to 
different attitudes towards uncertainties faced by the household singularly or jointly with the 
reference group and potential implications on rate of default on loans, attitudes towards 
insurance and so on. 
From a macro-economic perspective, the support that our results yield to the status-based 
view of conspicuous consumption typically imply an equilibrium with  over-consumption of 
certain goods at the expense of reduction in other essential outlays and savings. As a 
consequence, this shift in consumption patterns may lead to both static and dynamic 
inefficiencies and provisions of a selective consumption tax, a progressive income tax and 
redistributive policies which take the form of transfers in kind rather than in monetary terms 
may confer certain growth benefits in terms of both level and rate. Furthermore, the presence 
of status consciousness has important implications for the dependence of growth on 
inequality. A conventional wisdom often relied upon in the literature on growth and 
inequality (see for example the works of Kuznets (1955), Kaldor (1960), Kalecki (1971), 
Bertola (1993)) is that inequality promotes growth as the richer class engage more in 
investment activities. Our result on the contrary, suggests that inequality in the presence of 
status consciousness may lead even the rich to engage in consumption activities instead and 
this may lead to a lowering of the overall rate of growth. Apart from this, one may also 
question the potential for economic growth to boost overall utility in terms of “happiness” at 
the cost of inequality in the presence of status consciousness. This follows because status 
consciousness actually diminishes the welfare of an individual where given the individual’s 
income, the overall inequality rises. 
As a bottom-line of these discussions it may be concluded that obtaining a clearer 
understanding of the pathways through which reference groups exert their effects is crucial 
for public policy formulations. Policy decisions must adequately address the correlation 
between neighborhood indicators and individual outcomes of interest and design pragmatic 
14 
 
strategies endogenizing the interdependence between the individual and the neighborhood as 
the reference group. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive empirical study on status consciousness. We do 
not set out to test the predictions of the signaling model or for that matter, any theoretical 
model. We took an open ended approach and made multiple generalizations to the basic 
empirical models that are used in the recent past for testing status effect (For example, 
Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009)). We incorporated both the aspiration and pride 
aspects of status. We developed a new approach to classify status and non-status goods. Then 
we tested for the presence of status consciousness amongst individuals and also evaluated the 
impact of status on financial allocations of a household. 
There are two main results of our paper. The first is that status effect is present among U.S 
households. For our best models, which are those where we include fixed effects, we find that 
both pride and aspiration status variables are significant. When status is interacted with 
income, we find that pride aspect is significant for higher income group people which is a 
finding contrary to Duesenberry’s claim that the rich are not concerned about their relative 
position with respect to the relatively lower income group people. On the other hand, since 
the aspiration aspect of pride is significant in all regressions, this implies that our result is not 
supporting signaling model’s prediction, that is, as average income of the reference group 
increases, consumption of status goods decreases. 
The second main result of our paper is that status impacts the financial allocation of a 
household. Being status conscious, households shift consumption from essential commodities 
to status goods. We also showed that despite debt being a burden on the consumer, 
households incur debt to display status. Finally, our results indicate that households save less 
or run down assets/savings to buy status goods. All of these have strong policy implications 
which we have discussed above.  
Overall, our contribution to the status literature is in supporting the evidence of status 
consciousness using a more robust approach and second, demonstrating that status also 
impacts the financial allocations of a household. 
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 Appendix I – Metropolitan, Urban and Rural regions classification 
Region Description (numbers in M-Million; K-thousand) N Percent 
1 Central counties of metropolitan area with population >=1M  2,478 28 
2 Fringe counties of metropolitan area with population >=1M  1,338 15 
3 
Counties in metropolitan areas with population between 250K 
and 1M 
2,256 25 
4 Counties in metropolitan areas with population  < 250K  614 7 
5 Urban population (close to a metropolitan area)  >=20K  310 4 
6 Urban population (not close to a metropolitan area) >=20K  285 3 
7 Urban population (close to a metropolitan area) < 20K  594 7 
8 Urban population (not close to a metropolitan area) < 20K 737 8 
9 Rural 243 3 
Total  8,855 100 
Note: Region codes corresponding to ‘foreign’ and ‘not applicable’ are not included in the table. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 25 Percentile Median 
75 
Percentile 
Education 13.48 2.72 12 13 16 
Age 51.27 17.95 36 51 63 
Number of family members 2.22 1.36 1 2 3 
Number of children 0.52 1 0 0 1 
Married dummy (base – Single) 0.45     
Male dummy (base – Female) 0.68     
Black dummy (base – White) 0.15     
Other Race dummy (base – 
White) 0.06     
Total Expenditure $ 40,444 35,955 20,550 33,400 51,451 
Income $ 69,760 90,841 25,000 49,000 88,000 
Debt $ 10,339 31,997 0 400 9,000 
Wealth without home equity 220,000 980,000 700 18,000 140,000 
Wealth with Home equity 310,000 1,100,000 2,500 55,000 260,000 
Observations 8,661 
Note: If household is not in any U.S state  or if education variable is taking missing value or if race is not known, then 
that observation  is dropped from the sample. PSID weights are used. 
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Table 2 – Expenditure Summary 
Expenditures $ Mean SD 25 Percentile Median 
75 
Percentile 
Share of 
Expenditure 
Food 7,216 4,698 3,900 6,240 9,360 17.1% 
Food at home 5,092 3,387 2,600 4,420 6,500 12.1% 
Food outside 2,016 2,373 520 1,300 2,600 4.8% 
Food delivered 107 524 0 0 0 0.3% 
Non-Food 34,976 35,070 16,020 27,849 44,810 82.9% 
Housing 14,610 12,153 6,840 11,820 19,140 34.6% 
Transportation 8,654 10,323 2,335 5,880 11,640 20.5% 
Education 1,465 6,034 0 0 0 3.5% 
Childcare 393 2,048 0 0 0 0.9% 
Health 3,247 6,029 340 1,725 4,154 7.7% 
Household Repairs 1,894 15,186 0 100 1,000 4.5% 
Household Furnishing 1,020 6,388 0 200 1,000 2.4% 
Clothing 1,239 4,232 250 600 1,500 2.9% 
Trips 1,626 3,258 0 500 2,000 3.9% 
Other Recreation 828 3,370 0 300 800 2.0% 
Observations 8,661 
Note: If household is not in any U.S state  or if education variable is taking missing value or if race is not known, then that observation is 
dropped from the sample. PSID weights are used. 
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Table 3 – Ranking of goods across spend groups 
Spend Group 
Items Low Lower Middle Upper Middle Rich 
Telephone & Internet 2 1 1 1 
Food at Home 1 2 2 2 
Utilities 3 3 3 3 
Auto Insurance 4 4 4 4 
Gas 6 6 5 5 
Food Outside 5 5 6 6 
Clothing 7 7 7 7 
Trips 13 13 9 8 
Home Insurance 8 8 12 9 
Mortgage 18 14 15 10 
Health Insurance 9 10 11 11 
Other Recreation 10 9 8 12 
Doctor 14 12 13 13 
Home Furnishing 15 15 14 14 
Prescription 12 11 10 15 
Home Repairs 17 17 16 16 
Rent 11 16 18 17 
Vehicle Repairs 16 18 17 18 
Vehicle Addition 19 21 20 19 
Vehicle Loan 23 19 19 20 
Hospital 22 20 28 21 
Education 20 22 21 22 
Vehicle Down payment 21 23 25 23 
Food Delivered 27 27 22 24 
Parking 30 28 23 25 
Other Transportation 25 25 24 26 
Vehicle Lease 29 30 30 27 
Cab 24 29 26 28 
Bus 26 26 27 29 
Childcare 28 24 29 30 
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Table 4: Test for presence of status consciousness 
Share of Expenditure on Status Goods 
Regression I II III IV 
Aspiration aspect 1.1808** 1.9871*** 1.6266*** 2.5279*** 
 (0.4921) (0.7569) (0.5669) (0.8412) 
Pride aspect 0.4374*** 0.6048*** 0.5710*** 0.7612*** 
 (0.1529) (0.2169) (0.1782) (0.2406) 
Log(Total 
Expenditures) -2.3778*** -2.7756*** -3.2334*** -3.5457*** 
 (0.8611) (0.9497) (0.9842) (1.0451) 
Inverse of Total 
Expenditures -3.74e+04*** -3.67e+04*** -5.12e+04*** -4.77e+04*** 
 (1.26e+04) (1.14e+04) (1.44e+04) (1.27e+04) 
Log(Number of Adults) -0.0321 -0.0446** -0.0035 -0.0178 
 (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0291) (0.0270) 
Log(Number of Family 
members) 0.0285 0.0217 -0.0091 -0.0229 
 (0.0223) (0.0187) (0.0273) (0.0213) 
Age -0.0022 -0.0041** -0.0047* -0.0077*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0023) 
Age-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married Dummy(base-
Singles) 0.0472** 0.0390** 0.0444* 0.0307 
 (0.0211) (0.0198) (0.0260) (0.0237) 
Education 0.0022 0.0031 0.0003 0.0017 
 (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0029) 
Black Dummy(base-
White) 0.0287 0.0131 0.0475* 0.0158 
 (0.0195) (0.0154) (0.0257) (0.0210) 
Other race 
Dummy(base-White) 0.0122 0.0197 -0.0092 -0.0070 
 (0.0174) (0.0203) (0.0228) (0.0242) 
Food Stamps  Dummy -0.0259 -0.0228 -0.0252 -0.0187 
 (0.0186) (0.0180) (0.0224) (0.0212) 
Male dummy(base-
Female) -0.0162 -0.0171 -0.0142 -0.0131 
 (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0231) (0.0211) 
Constant 9.3236***  12.4589***  
 (2.9138)  (3.4853)  
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5,197 5,197 5,197 5,197 
Weak Identification 
Test (Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald F Statistic) 
51.047 40.042 51.047 40.042 
Endogeneity Test – 
Chi-sq value 27.371 27.001 27.371 27.001 
Endogeneity Test – P 
value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note:  *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 2. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. Regressions I & II and III & IV are with rank cut-offs 10 and 15 respectively. 
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Table 5: Tobit Regression Results for Effect of Status on Debt 
Regression I II 
Aspiration aspect 0.7851 1.2012* 
 (0.5003) (0.7266) 
Pride aspect 1.4876*** 1.3306*** 
 (0.3752) (0.5140) 
Log(Income) 0.1799 0.1376 
 (0.1505) (0.1495) 
Log(Number of Adults) 1.3071*** 1.2073*** 
 (0.3821) (0.3969) 
Log(Number of Family members) -0.9359*** -0.8860*** 
 (0.2681) (0.2735) 
Age -0.0154 -0.0211 
 (0.0303) (0.0320) 
Age-squared -0.0006* -0.0005* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education 0.1821*** 0.1729*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0443) 
Black Dummy(base-White) -0.1653 0.0999 
 (0.2746) (0.2654) 
Other race Dummy(base-White) -0.4982 -0.2936 
 (0.5491) (0.5506) 
Married Dummy(base-Singles) 0.6384*** 0.6800*** 
 (0.2361) (0.2339) 
Food Stamps  Dummy 0.6100* 0.5750* 
 (0.3317) (0.3200) 
Male dummy(base-Female) -1.0040*** -1.0825*** 
 (0.2583) (0.2576) 
Constant -19.9107*** -21.6088*** 
 (3.2338) (4.0260) 
Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 5,197 5,197 
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Effect of Status on Total Expenditure 
Regression I II 
Aspiration aspect  0.5900*** 0.8136*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0589) 
Pride aspect 0.6268*** 0.6632*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0462) 
Log(Brought-in-cash) 0.0445*** 0.0314*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0051) 
Log(Number of Adults) -0.0066 -0.0102 
 (0.0110) (0.0087) 
Log(Number of Family members) 0.0515*** 0.0283*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0059) 
Age 0.0019** -0.0001 
 (0.0009) (0.0007) 
Age-squared -0.0000** -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Education -0.0005 0.0007 
 (0.0012) (0.0009) 
Black Dummy(base-White) 0.0068 0.0001 
 (0.0117) (0.0080) 
 Other race Dummy(base-White) -0.0124 0.0102 
 (0.0185) (0.0111) 
Married Dummy(base-Singles) 0.0223*** 0.0086 
 (0.0085) (0.0076) 
Food Stamps  Dummy -0.0099 -0.0075 
 (0.0124) (0.0088) 
Male dummy(base-Female) 0.0019 0.0003 
 (0.0075) (0.0053) 
Constant -2.7589*** -5.2711*** 
 (0.3976) (0.3914) 
Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 5,201 5,201 
R-squared 0.91 0.95 
Note:  *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 7: Effect of Status on Total Expenditure-Income Quantiles 
Regression I II 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q1 0.4817*** 0.7918*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0724) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q2 0.5441*** 0.7826*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0685) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q3 0.5511*** 0.7895*** 
 (0.0649) (0.0676) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q4 0.5547*** 0.7999*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0598) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q5 0.5817*** 0.8079*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0663) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q6 0.6072*** 0.8213*** 
 (0.0648) (0.0649) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q7 0.6022*** 0.7716*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0737) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q8 0.6801*** 0.8634*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0665) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q9 0.6164*** 0.8263*** 
 (0.0764) (0.0691) 
Aspiration aspect x Income Q10 0.7235*** 0.8938*** 
 (0.0689) (0.0675) 
Pride aspect x Income Q1 0.7423*** 0.6837*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0566) 
Pride aspect x Income Q2 0.6742*** 0.6946*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0556) 
Pride aspect x Income Q3 0.6675*** 0.6879*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0617) 
Pride aspect x Income Q4 0.6643*** 0.6755*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0483) 
Pride aspect x Income Q5 0.6353*** 0.6673*** 
 (0.0829) (0.0610) 
Pride aspect x Income Q6 0.6084*** 0.6518*** 
 (0.0535) (0.0537) 
Pride aspect x Income Q7 0.6134*** 0.7075*** 
 (0.0697) (0.0655) 
Pride aspect x Income Q8 0.5289*** 0.6085*** 
 (0.0699) (0.0614) 
Pride aspect x Income Q9 0.5987*** 0.6480*** 
 (0.0757) (0.0657) 
Pride aspect x Income Q10 0.4819*** 0.5753*** 
 (0.0669) (0.0662) 
Log(Number of Adults) -0.0049 -0.0097 
 (0.0108) (0.0086) 
Log(Number of Family members) 0.0654*** 0.0370*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0094) 
Log(Brought-in-cash) 0.0286*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0061) 
Age 0.0017* -0.0003 
 (0.0009) (0.0007) 
Age-squared -0.0000** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Education -0.0006 0.0005 
 (0.0012) (0.0008) 
Black Dummy(base-White) 0.0081 0.0001 
 (0.0119) (0.0082) 
Other race Dummy(base-White) -0.0139 0.0079 
 (0.0181) (0.0106) 
Married Dummy(base-Singles) 0.0219** 0.0088 
 (0.0085) (0.0076) 
Food Stamps  Dummy -0.0021 -0.0060 
 (0.0117) (0.0095) 
Male dummy(base-Female) 0.0012 -0.0001 
 (0.0079) (0.0054) 
Constant -2.5794*** -5.1547*** 
 (0.4263) (0.4149) 
Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 5,201 5,201 
R-squared 0.92 0.95 
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
